A number of years in the past, I developed a place I known as ‘moral behaviourism’ and utilized it to debates in regards to the ethical standing of synthetic beings. Roughly, moral behaviourism is an ethical equal of the Turing check for synthetic intelligence. It states that if an entity appears to be like and acts like one other entity with ethical standing, then you must act as if it has that standing. Extra strongly, it states that the very best proof we have now for figuring out that one other entity has ethical standing is behavioural. No different type of proof (mechanical, ontological, historic) trumps the behavioural proof.
My longest defence of this concept comes from my unique article “Welcoming Robots into the Ethical Group: A Defence of Moral Behaviourism” (official; open access), however, in some ways, I favor the subsequent defence that I wrote up for a lecture in 2019 (obtainable right here). The latter article clarifies sure factors from my unique article and responds to further objections.
I’ve by no means claimed that moral behaviourism is especially unique or insightful. Very comparable positions have been developed and defended by others previously. However, for no matter cause, it has piqued the curiosity of different researchers. The unique paper has been cited almost 80 occasions, although most of these citations are ‘by the way in which’. Extra considerably, there at the moment are a number of attention-grabbing and substantive critiques and developments on it obtainable within the literature. I assumed it will be worthwhile linking to a few of the extra important ones right here. I hyperlink to open entry variations wherever doable.
If you realize of different substantive engagements with the idea, please let me know.
- “The ethics of interaction with neurorobotic agents: a case study with BabyX” by Knott, Sagar and Takac – That is presumably probably the most attention-grabbing paper partaking with the thought of moral behaviourism. It’s a case examine of an precise synthetic agent/entity. In the end, the authors argue that my concept doesn’t account for the expertise of individuals interacting with this agent, and counsel that synthetic brokers that mimic sure organic mechanisms usually tend to warrant the ascription of ethical patiency.
- ‘Is it time for rights for robots? Moral status in artificial entities‘ by Vincent Müller – A critique of all proponents of ethical standing for robots that features considerably ill-tempered critique of my concept. Müller admits he’s providing a ‘nasty reconstruction’ (one thing akin to a ‘reductio advert absurdum’) of his opponents’ views. I believe he misrepresents my concept on sure key factors. I’ve corresponded with him about it, however I will not record my objections right here.
- ‘Social Good Versus Robot Well-Being: On the Principle of Procreative Beneficence and Robot Gendering‘ by Ryan Blake Jackson and Tom Williams – One of many throwaway claims I made in my unique paper on moral behaviourism was that, if the idea is right, robotic designers might have ‘procreative’ duties towards robots. Particularly, they could be obliged to observe the precept of procreative beneficence (make the very best robots it’s doable to make). The authors of this paper take up, and in the end dismiss, this concept. In contrast to Müller’s paper, this one is a good-natured critique of my views.
- ‘How Could We Know When a Robot was a Moral Patient?‘ by Henry Shevlin – A helpful evaluation of the completely different standards we may use to find out the ethical patiency of a robotic. Broadly sympathetic to my place however means that it must be modified to incorporate cognitive equivalency and never simply behavioural equivalency.
