“It’s customary to divide the ethical panorama into deontology, consequentialism, and advantage ethics, thereby assuming that these three are mutually unique and collectively exhaustive. I, like some others, discover this deeply problematic…”
The next is a visitor put up by Douglas Portmore, Professor of Philosophy at Arizona State College. It’s a part of the series of weekly visitor posts by totally different authors at Every day Nous this summer.
Deontology Is Appropriate with Act-Consequentialism
by Douglas Portmore
In philosophy textbooks, it’s customary to divide the ethical panorama into deontology, consequentialism, and advantage ethics, thereby assuming that these three are mutually unique and collectively exhaustive. I, like some others, discover this deeply problematic.
One drawback that I’ve with this “Textbook View” is that it assumes that “deontological theories are greatest understood in distinction to consequentialist ones” (Alexander & Moore 2020). I, nonetheless, consider that deontology is appropriate with act-consequentialism—one thing that Jake Zuehl satisfied me of in Might 2017. Let me clarify what satisfied me.
Broadly construed, act-consequentialism is the view that the last word right-making function of an act is that its consequence will not be evaluatively outranked by that of any accessible different (Portmore manuscript). And word each that an act’s consequence is to be construed broadly to incorporate every part that will be the case if it had been carried out and that to evaluatively rank (hereafter, merely ‘rank’) a set of outcomes is to rank them when it comes to some evaluative notion, resembling ‘good’, ‘good for’, ‘becoming to want’, or ‘must be most popular’.
Once we mix act-consequentialism with alternative ways of rating outcomes, we get totally different variations of act-consequentialism. As an illustration, classical utilitarianism (Bentham 1780) combines act-consequentialism with the view that outcomes are to be ranked when it comes to their total goodness, which classical utilitarians take to be solely a perform of the intensities and durations of the pleasures and pains that they comprise. This concept implies that brokers should all the time maximize the general good. Against this, moral egoism is an act-consequentialist concept that ranks outcomes when it comes to how good they’re for the agent. It holds that one consequence outranks one other if and solely whether it is higher for the agent. Thus, moral egoism implies that an agent ought to provide the end result that’s greatest for themself even when it’s worse total.
There are a minimum of three causes for considering that that is how ‘act-consequentialism’ must be outlined. First, it’s appropriately broad in that it consists of theories which might be usually regarded to be act-consequentialist, resembling moral egoism (Wikipedia), classical utilitarianism, self/different utilitarianism (Sider 1993), rights consequentialism (Sen 1982), and satisficing consequentialism. Second, it’s appropriately slim in that it excludes theories which might be usually regarded to not be act-consequentialist, resembling Kantianism, advantage ethics, motive utilitarianism (Adams 1976), rule-consequentialism, and theological voluntarism (Murphy 2019). (Admittedly, deontology is commonly thought to not be act-consequentialist, and, but, this definition fails to exclude all types of it—or so I’ll be arguing. However I hope to indicate that this thought is mistaken in addition to to diagnose what has led some to make this error.) Third, it accounts for the truth that “the time period ‘[act-]consequentialism’ appears to be used as a household resemblance time period to discuss with any descendant of traditional[al] utilitarianism that continues to be shut sufficient to its ancestor within the vital respects” (Sinnott-Armstrong 2019)—the vital respects being those who account for classical utilitarianism’s tendency to “hang-out even these of us is not going to consider in it” (Foot 1985, 196). For, as Philippa Foot famous, classical utilitarianism’s act-“consequentialist aspect is likely one of the fundamental explanation why [classical] utilitarianism appears so compelling” in addition to the primary motive why “the transfer to rule utilitarianism appears to be an unsatisfactory reply to the issue of reconciling utilitarianism with frequent ethical opinion” (1985, 196 & 198). And there’s certainly one thing fairly compelling concerning the act-consequentialist concept that we must always first inform brokers easy methods to rank the varied potential worlds that they might actualize by way of their actions after which direct them to carry out whichever act would actualize the one which ranks highest—the one which they must desire to each accessible different (see Portmore 2011, 34–38).
So, that’s how ‘act-consequentialism’ must be outlined. How, although, ought to ‘deontology’ be outlined? It’s, I consider, greatest outlined because the view that there are agent-centered restrictions which might be finally grounded in our obligation to respect individuals—beings who’re autonomous within the sense of being able to using motive to set and pursue their very own ends. (Agent-centered restrictions prohibit an agent from performing sure varieties of acts even to stop two or extra others from every performing a morally comparable occasion of that act-type. Thus, commonsense morality consists of such a restriction in that it prohibits you from breaking your promise even to stop two or extra others from every breaking their guarantees.) Admittedly, some would possibly take into account this view to be too particularly Kantian to be definitive of ‘deontology’. However, even so, they need to admit that this view is deontological—and, certainly, paradigmatically so. So, if I can present that this deontological view is appropriate with act-consequentialism, I’ll have proven that deontology is appropriate with act-consequentialism.
To see that this deontological view is appropriate with act-consequentialism, take into account Kantian act-consequentialism, or ‘Kantsequentialism’ for brief (Portmore forthcoming). It holds each that
(K1) an agent’s refraining from treating individuals as mere means is true as a result of
(a) the last word right-making function of an act is that its consequence will not be outranked by that of any accessible different and
(b) the end result of an agent’s refraining from treating individuals as mere means will not be outranked by that of any accessible different
and that
(K2) the end result of an agent’s refraining from treating individuals as mere means will not be outranked by that of any accessible different as a result of individuals are ends-in-themselves who’re owed respect, and respecting them necessitates refraining from treating them as mere means.
The concept is that, on condition that brokers owe individuals respect, they must rank the end result of their refraining from treating them as mere means above the end result of their treating them as mere means, and this, in flip, explains why, given act-consequentialism, brokers must chorus from treating individuals as mere means.
From K1 and K2, it follows that
(K3) an agent’s refraining from treating individuals as mere means is true finally as a result of individuals are ends-in-themselves who’re owed respect.
And, given K1–K3, Kantsequentialism is deontological. For it consists of an agent-centered restriction towards treating individuals as mere means that’s finally grounded within the obligation to respect individuals. Thus, it implies that I shouldn’t homicide one particular person even to stop the mafia from murdering 5 others and that that is finally as a result of my would-be sufferer is an individual whom I’ve an obligation to respect.
After all, some could object that if Kantsequentialism holds that an agent’s refraining from treating individuals as mere means is true finally as a result of individuals are ends-in-themselves who’re owed respect, then it will possibly’t be an act-consequentialist concept. They’re assuming that act-consequentialists can’t maintain this and should as a substitute maintain that what finally explains the truth that refraining from treating individuals as mere means is true is one thing like the truth that its consequence will not be outranked by that of any accessible different. However this assumption is fake.
To show this, I’ll must attraction to the excellence between the last word right-making function of an motion and the truth that finally explains its rightness.
For instance this distinction, take into account the act of flipping the swap in the Trolley Problem, and assume that this act would maximize the nice by maximizing the variety of lives saved. In response to classical utilitarianism, the last word right-making function of flipping the swap will not be that it will maximize the variety of lives saved, however that it will maximize the nice. In spite of everything, classical utilitarians maintain that it will be improper to maximise the variety of lives saved if doing so would fail to maximise the nice. Now, some classical utilitarians (e.g., Moore 1903) consider that ‘proper’ simply means ‘produces the very best consequence’. And, on their view, the truth that finally explains the rightness of flipping the swap (on condition that doing so would produce the very best consequence) is the truth that ‘proper’ simply means ‘produces the very best consequence’. Thus, classical utilitarians maintain that whereas the last word right-making function of flipping the swap is that it maximizes the nice, the truth that finally explains the rightness of flipping the swap is the truth that ‘proper’ simply means ‘produces the very best consequence’.
Now, to see that it’s a mistake to suppose that act-consequentialists should maintain that what finally explains the truth that a sure act is true is the truth that its consequence will not be outranked by that of any accessible different, take into account William Paley’s utilitarian theological voluntarism (1802). It holds each that
(UTV1) an agent’s maximizing utility is true as a result of
(a) the last word right-making function of an act is that it accords with God’s will and
(b) God wills brokers to maximise utility
and that
(UTV2) God wills brokers to maximise utility as a result of God is completely good, and his good goodness necessitates his keen brokers to maximise utility—utility being what’s good.
And, from UTV1 and UTV2, it follows that
(UTV3) an agent’s maximizing utility is true finally as a result of God is completely good.
In different phrases, utilitarian theological voluntarism holds that what finally explains the truth that maximizing utility is true is the truth that God is completely good, not the truth that God wills brokers to maximise utility. But, Paley’s concept is clearly theological voluntarist, for it’s dedicated to UTV1a—the concept that the last word right-making function of an act is that it accords with God’s will.
It appears, then, that ethical theories are to be differentiated when it comes to what they take the last word right-making function of actions to be, not when it comes to what truth they maintain finally explains their rightness. And if Paley’s concept counts as theological voluntarist given its dedication to UTV1a and regardless of its holding that what finally explains the truth that maximizing utility is true is the truth that God is completely good, then Kantsequentialism should rely as act-consequentialist given its dedication to K1a (the concept that the last word right-making function of an act is that its consequence will not be outranked by that of any accessible different) and regardless of its holding that what finally explains the truth that refraining from treating individuals as mere means is true is the truth that individuals are ends-in-themselves who’re owed respect.
Thus, Kantsequentialism is each deontological and act-consequentialist. And that signifies that deontology is appropriate with act-consequentialism.
