Individuality in Vaikuṇṭha – The Indian Philosophy Blog

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Do the inhabitants of Vaikuṇṭha have needs (or solely God’s ones)? Veṅkaṭanātha’s Nyāyasiddhāñjana 174–6 appears to counsel that they’ll will:

In the identical manner, Ananta and Garuḍa and the opposite (completely liberated souls) and the liberated souls assume this or that type based mostly on their will.

(tathā anantagaruḍādīnāṃ muktānāñ ca icchākṛtatattadrūpam).

However their will, is it a person will or the identical will repeated for every of them? Probably the latter. Let me clarify by elaborating on a unique matter, particularly that of tedium in heaven.

Christopher M. Brown (Brown 2021) means that “our expertise of boredom on this life is in reality reflective both of the timeboundedness of the products which might be central to human expertise on this life […] or the character of time as we expertise it on this life” (p. 420). That is most likely true, which tells us that the expertise of superhuman beings in heaven is radically incomparable with ours. Can it’s nonetheless fascinating?

Brown doesn’t handle this concern instantly, however tries to make examples of products that may very well be skilled in heaven and that we are able to conceive as being items, thus implicitly suggesting that heaven can be fascinating. For example, he speaks of the pure human need for information of creatures is perfected within the best manner logically attainable" (p. 421). However is information fascinating per se? Do not we want to realize information? Do not we benefit from the strategy of studying and discovering? Thus, the instance of data doesn't make sense as a case of a pleasure human beings can analogically relate to. Fairly, it's a case of taking part in God's nature. And happiness in heaven isextreme” in accordance with Brown, who’s right here quoting Thomas Aquinas (who, in flip, appears to be pointing to one thing much like what Veṅkaṭanātha had in thoughts). But when this all applies, individuals in Vaikuṇṭha or heaven are essentially very completely different than individuals on earth (who had particular needs and restricted information). By which sense may they be stated to retain their “persona”? And if this isn’t retained, how fascinating can heaven be, for us, who’re hooked up to our personalities? Brown addresses this concern not directly (pp. 424–425) by suggesting that there could be radical adjustments in a single’s persona whereas retaining one’s numerical id with oneself (as within the case of Augustine’s conversion or within the case of individuals surviving a suicidal try and wanting to dwell). Brown then goes on deciphering Thomas as saying that grace doesn’t destroy human nature, however perfects it, preserving private id by the transformation. On the finish of the method, human beings (who cooperate with the motion of grace) in heaven might be a deified nature and deified rational powers of mind and can. Brown thinks that bizarre human beings can have a foreshadow of this expertise by contemplation, that results in a form of timeless expertise. An additional proof of this risk is the lifetime of saints, who appear to have skilled this form of experiences inside their earthly life. In different phrases, if many people assume that heaven (or Vaikuṇṭha) is unappealing, this may imply simply that we’re unprepared for it. Happily, this unpreparedness could be addressed (by an additional rebirth or by purgatory). Mustn’t it’s attainable to proceed enhancing even in Heaven/Vaikuṇṭha? That will absolutely be an antidote to boredom, but it surely seems to conflict with the thought of heaven/Vaikuṇṭha being an ideal world, a kingdom of ends.

As for Vaikuṇṭha and the chance of getting boring, attainable options are:

  1. Being in nityakaiṅkārya `perpetual service to God’ is your nature and that is intrinsically appeasing, so, there isn’t any manner it might ever get boring.
  2. You share sābhogya `similar expertise’ with God, so there may be dynamism implied (because you proceed having attention-grabbing experiences).

Becoming a member of this with Brown’s dialogue of tedium, the answer to the issue of boredom can consist in one of many following:

a. Capability to assist others (together with serving God Himself, as in 1. above)

b. Lack of id (as implied by 2. above)

c. Gradual transformation of id (as in Brown)

b. and c. are very related for us right here. Even when individuals can retain their numerical id with their lives on earth, are they nonetheless qualitatively distinguishable from one another? Are their ideas distinguishable? Them not having distinguishable ideas gives a neat clarification of their being excellent devotees and is totally appropriate with omniscience. The chance of tedium can be eradicated by the truth that such excellent beings would don’t have any impartial needs and thus no impartial emotions, together with no boredom.

Summing up, one risk is (with speculation b.) that boredom is inconceivable as a result of there isn’t any one experiencing it (however is it actually one thing one can aspire to? and, extra related, this cancels the opportunity of service, which is clearly a constructing block of Vaikuṇṭha in accordance with Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta authors).

A distinct risk wants retaining the number of personalities even amongst liberated souls: the infinite number of sensations (as in 1.). Wouldn’t they themselves turn out to be boring? No, if they’re shared with expensive individuals (therefore the significance of a group in Vaikuṇṭha) and if one serves (since serving is one’s true future and since one is rarely bored of serving to). Therefore, once more, the significance of a group and therefore defined the insistence on different individuals welcoming one to Vaikuṇṭha. One will oneself quickly be a part of that group.



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