Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò’s Against Decolonisation: Taking African Agency Seriously delivers a clearly-articulated and well-supported protection of its eponymous thesis. It ought to come as no shock to longtime readers of Táíwò that right here he gives a thoroughgoing, meticulously-argued textual content making various mental engagements with a wide range of African thinkers.
For my functions beneath, will probably be best to begin with a summative view: I like to recommend this textual content very extremely to anybody with an curiosity in African political thought or decolonial principle. I preserve that it may be interpreted when it comes to two senses of its thesis. The primary sense is that Táíwò’s thesis requires rejecting what he phrases decolonisation2. (Notice: To extra fluidly interface with Táíwò’s conceptual work, I’ll stylize “decolonisation” and its cognates when it comes to the British English conference, whereas in any other case using American English conventions.) I discover the case for this primary thesis to be a conclusive one; I discover it additionally to be a extremely participating one stuffed with rigorous scholarship that’s rewarding in its personal proper. The second sense is Táíwò’s thesis that the notion of decolonisation in post-independence Africa must be deserted altogether, for the reason that defensible notion of decolonisation (decolonisation1) has already been achieved.
With regard to this second, extra far-reaching sense of Táíwò’s thesis, I’m not altogether satisfied, albeit in lots of respects extremely sympathetic. I don’t discover the textual content to suffice in arriving on the necessity of this stronger conclusion. Nonetheless, as a result of Táíwò’s case for the chance of this needs to be taken significantly by political thinkers and decolonial theorists, my critique beneath shouldn’t be taken as ample to reject this thesis; it’s, moderately, an effort to increase the dialog. To that finish, I’ll begin by briefly explicating Táíwò’s case for his extra modest thesis. Then, within the spirit of Táíwò’s name for “the decolonisers” to make their causes for sustaining the decolonisation trope clearer and extra coherent, I’ll supply a quick philosophical critique of Táíwò’s further-reaching thesis in gentle of an acceptance of his rejection of decolonisation2.
Towards Decolonisation2
Táíwò builds his case in opposition to the decolonisation trope on the premise of a distinction between two meanings of decolonisation. Decolonisation1 denotes “making a colony right into a self-governing entity with its political and financial fortunes below its personal route (although not essentially management)…” (3). Decolonisation2, against this, denotes “forcing an ex-colony to forswear, on ache of being eternally below the yoke of colonization, any and each cultural, political, mental, social and linguistic artefact, thought, course of, establishment and follow that retains even the slightest whiff of the colonial previous” (3).
Táíwò defends decolonisation1 however rejects decolonisation2. As a result of decolonisation1 is not a stay concern for Africa—outdoors Western Sahara—the metonymic conflation of decolonisation1 and decolonisation2 permits decolonisation2 to commerce on decolonisation1’s good title. Therefore, in gentle of his case in opposition to decolonisation2, Táíwò concludes the decolonisation trope must be deserted altogether because it shields very actual issues with decolonisation2 from scrutiny below the protect of decolonisation1’s desirability.
The broad facets of Táíwò’s case in opposition to decolonisation2 shall be acquainted to students of post-colonial phenomena, however the specifics of his articulations of those points and his engagements with African mental historical past are each novel and exemplary. The crux of the matter is that “Decolonising students can’t escape a Manichaen division during which (simply as throughout colonial occasions), the colonised and the colonisers should occupy solely distinct areas [where] ‘ne’er the twain shall meet’. Any colonialism-tinged phenomena should be purged from the postcolonial world” (7–8). In actuality, coloniser and colonised work together dynamically; the relation between the 2 produces establishments, concepts, and artifacts that don’t precede the colonial encounter. The identical goes for interactions between such societies that precede colonialism itself. In all these relations, those that have been colonised are brokers who assess and have interaction with the cultural, financial, and political types of colonisers and their broader milieux. Decolonisation2, because it requires expunging in any respect displays inheritance from colonisers, negates the company of colonised in navigating these inheritances complexly. Thus, Táíwò surmises, “the last word downside with decolonisation discourse is its oft-unapprehended failure to take significantly the complexity of African company and the various methods it has grappled with each colonialism and its legacy…” (184).
African mental, cultural, and political historical past are replete with cultural engagements with Europeans, a substantial quantity of which, as Táíwò repeatedly notes, preceded colonialism. Earlier than, throughout, and after colonialism, Africans have been brokers of mental, cultural, and political transformations. Such transformations are, in fact, each for higher and for worse. However the name for decolonisation2 presupposes that these transformations are by definition for worse, and that African company on this regard has been both non-existent or regrettable. The upshot is that decolonisation2 fetishizes an imagined, purely autochthonous African previous and insists on constructing African futures within the picture of that imagined previous. The real pasts, presents, and futures produced by African brokers are thus to be disposed of, misunderstood, and/or ignored.
Insofar as the decision for decolonisation2 quantities to an embrace of what we would name autochthonism—during which solely that which is wholly produced by a society’s native or indigenous traditions will be accepted as reputable—we might characterize decolonisation2 as being premised on what Michael Monahan has termed a “politics of purity.” As Monahan broadly argues, and as Táíwò’s work on this textual content and past amply illustrates, such appeals relaxation each on a fallacious attraction to a mythic purity in addition to an indefensible assumption that such purity is intrinsically fascinating. Autochthonism, then, couldn’t probably take African company significantly because it fails to acknowledge the methods Africans have been brokers in creolizing imports and are brokers in electing to affirm concepts and establishments which mirror combination.
For Táíwò, foremost among the many follies of autochthonist requires decolonisation2 is their relation to modernity. Many readers shall be aware of Táíwò’s case for modernity in his How Colonialism Preempted Modernity in Africa and Africa Must Be Modern: A Manifesto. The previous textual content was the 2015 winner of the Frantz Fanon Book Prize and in my humble evaluation, doubtless crucial work on the subject of modernity on this century; whereas Towards Decolonisation stands by itself, these wishing to critically assess its claims will profit immensely from taking these two texts in live performance. In short, Táíwò’s view could possibly be recast as a critique of an African politics of purity that makes no room for modernity, regardless of modernity’s desirability for humanity at massive and Africa specifically. Táíwò writes that “As a result of modernity is conflated with Westernism and with ‘whiteness’—and all three with colonialism—decolonisation has turn out to be a catch-all thought to deal with something with any, even minor, affiliation with the ‘West’” (xvi).
Modernity, although, as Táíwò persuasively demonstrates all through his corpus, shouldn’t be an intrinsically “Western,” white, or colonial affair. As argued in How Colonialism Preempted Modernity in Africa, modernity was a subject of Euro-African cultural alternate, each given contextually African articulations and variations by Africans and unfold by them previous to European colonialism in Africa. To take “modernity” as intrinsically European or colonial, then, is to misconstrue each its philosophical contents and its historic unfolding. Additional, to claim that modernity is particularly a product of colonialism is to double down on these errors, since colonialism correct is an effort to exclude the colonised from modernity’s ensures: “…colonialism was characterised by the denial to the colonised of the trendy philosophical tenet of political legitimacy, which insists that no-one ought to need to obey the rule of any authorities to which she has not consented” (33). Modernity is against colonialism, which suggests prima facie that colonialism’s termination by decolonisation1 requires the event of modernity in former colonies; an embrace of modernity, moderately than decolonisation2, is on this account the logical consequent of profitable decolonisation1.
To this finish, Táíwò gives a compelling account of basic African philosophers of decolonisation as proponents of modernity and critics of decolonisation2. Táíwò presents a robust case for this within the context of Frantz Fanon, Amilcar Cabral, Kwame Nkrumah, and Léopold Sédar Senghor.
From there, Táíwò takes on two of the main lights within the post-independence African decolonisation discourse, Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o and Kwasi Wiredu, the place language takes heart stage. Whereas Táíwò is sympathetic to the problems that drove Ngũgĩ to proffer the mission of “decolonising the thoughts” and Wiredu that of “conceptual decolonization,” he gives a rigorous working by of the problems that every entails, which for college kids of African philosophy is a selected spotlight of Towards Decolonisation. Briefly, Táíwò clearly demonstrates that, as articulated, the virtues of those approaches stem from venturing properly past the scope of decolonisation2, whereas their largest vices are to be discovered of their fetishizing of de-Westernization the place the a priori worth of such is fallaciously assumed and its a posteriori impacts contain clouding the discourse on African modernity.
Taking African company significantly would contain, Táíwò contends, assuming that Africans ought to decide for themselves whether or not conventional concepts and establishments are preferable to concepts and establishments of overseas or combined provenance. Within the philosophical discourse on decolonisation, Táíwò notes that “aside from thinkers like Wiredu and the late Kwame Gyekye, it’s uncommon amongst tutorial philosophers to seek out proponents of decolonising who lay out defects of their indigenous heritage and the way such are to be resolved” (175). Even when it have been granted that philosophical decolonisation must be primarily involved with unearthing fruitful ideas autochthonous to communities later colonized, philosophizing by these ideas name for his or her evaluation in gentle of competing ideas, and the a priori assumption of autochthonism both preempts or distorts such evaluation.
“The tragedy of decolonisation2,” Táíwò concludes, “is that it can’t condone the thought of any Africans embracing modernity as their very own and in search of methods of redeeming its promise for his or her societies. Maybe probably the most pernicious wall erected by decolonisation is the truncating of the historical past of Africa’s wealthy and lengthy engagement with modernity” (192). Since Africa should be fashionable, and decolonisation2 rejects or obfuscates modernity, Africa should reject decolonisation2.
Assessing the Decolonisation Trope
Insofar as Táíwò’s case is in opposition to the continuing use of the notion of decolonisation normally, versus merely a polemic in opposition to decolonisation2, central to it’s taking significantly African company in having achieved decolonisation1. Failure to do that, alongside the impartial ills of decolonisation2, distorts not solely the success of anti-colonial struggles however the failures of African polities and leaders to journey extra felicitous post-independence paths. Táíwò writes:
[T]o flip colonialism into crucial and even the one ingredient in explaining social phenomena in Africa can’t be believable, ample or right. That is, for me, most likely probably the most vexing side of the decolonisation trope. As a result of colonialism is adopted as the only or dominant axis on which to plot the continent’s historical past and occasions post-colonisation—and no critical consideration is paid to the fractures, cleavages and totally different historicities as colonialism advanced—the various divergences that characterize it are glossed over in most analyses.
(148)
Insisting on decolonisation as a post-independence telos and/or methodology crowds out the potential for imagining African nations and politics in any other case. If all one might entertain are probably the most environment friendly technique of decolonising, then one is left with a purely damaging mission, moderately than the far more daunting activity of articulating constructive options. Given that it’s the nature of positivity and negativity to be co-determining in producing human acts and concepts (one can’t posit x with out some sense of negating what’s not x, and vice versa), the upshot is solely the underdevelopment of constructive potentialities and a hypertrophy of overwrought negativities.
Nonetheless, whereas it’s actually the case that many avatars of the decolonisation trope regard decolonisation as an absolute worth, assessing the worth of the trope itself requires assessing, as properly, its that means the place its worth shouldn’t be presumed to be absolute. In sum, there may be the query of whether or not, for example, a way of decolonisation will be imagined which is appropriate with Táíwò’s name for modernity. Given Táíwò’s cogent advocacy of modernity, can we not envision a dedication to decolonisation that opts for modernity the place decolonisation and modernity come into battle?
Right here, in fact, Táíwò has already offered an preliminary reply: modernity and decolonisation1 are appropriate, certainly, to the purpose the place the latter is a prerequisite to attaining the previous. Since Táíwò is a proponent of decolonisation1, his case in opposition to “decolonisation” is in impact an argument in opposition to decolonisation~1, the place the subscript “~1” signifies “not 1.” That’s to say, Táíwò is in opposition to the invocation of any notion decolonisation aside from decolonisation1. But we might ask, what of the potential for a decolonisation3, or decolonisationn, which may redeem the decolonisation trope in gentle of Táíwò’s critique? Actually, the definitions of decolonisation1 (“making a colony right into a self-governing entity…”) and decolonisation2 (“forcing an ex-colony to forswear [whatever] retains even the slightest whiff of the colonial previous”) don’t represent a strict dichotomy. There’s a lot which meets neither definition. The query is why various conceptions also needs to be understood as conceptions of decolonisation; what makes them decolonising?
Earlier than positing options on different senses “decolonisation” may take, allow us to contemplate one case already examined by Táíwò, that of Wiredu’s name for conceptual decolonisation. As Táíwò repeatedly demonstrates, Wireduian decolonisation is a essential endeavor, one which rejects autochthonism for the reason that inherited “Western” idea and its potential indigenous synonyms need to be evaluated in relation to one another. Wiredu doesn’t log out on the a priori assumption that ideas within the languages of the colonisers are essentially inferior to indigenous options, nor that indigenous options can’t themselves be inferior. Certainly, Wireduian decolonisation implies that the inquirer may discover the usage of “Western” ideas a fortiori fascinating as soon as this means of conceptual decolonisation has been undertaken. Táíwò quotes Zeyad el Nabolsy’s declare that
Wiredu defines decolonisation in procedural phrases, i.e., for Wiredu decolonisation has been undertaken efficiently when the conceptual frameworks which have been inherited from the colonial previous have been critically examined. …Lots of those that draw on Wiredu misunderstand this level by taking him to be claiming that decolonisation is outlined in substantive phrases… [where] what issues most… is the finish end result, i.e., the abandonment of the conceptual frameworks which have been inherited from the colonial previous.
(95)
If that is so, isn’t it merely the case that Wiredu is a proponent of “decolonisation” however not decolonisation2? Wiredu’s decolonisation is, maybe, decolonisationW. Insofar as Táíwò gives a provocative and rigorous critique of Wiredu, this a part of the textual content helps his case in opposition to decolonisation~1, nevertheless it undermines the textual content’s seeming assumption that decolonisation~1 is interchangeable with decolonisation2.
An alternate briefly addressed by Táíwò is “decoloniality.” Táíwò is doubtful of the worth of this idea however refrains from elaborating on it, since its proponents do regard it as conceptually distinct from decolonisation. I share Táíwò’s dubiety in regards to the idea; what’s decoloniality if its achievement shouldn’t be “decolonising”? It has lengthy struck me as a grammatical misfit that works in slogans however in and of itself provides nothing significant that its antecedent idea, coloniality, doesn’t already convey to the desk.
Nonetheless, whereas Táíwò’s textual content actually supplies oblique assist for the notion that the thought of coloniality could be topic to overuse within the African context which might inhibit taking African company significantly, on their face these are causes to not abuse the coloniality idea moderately than causes to eschew it. From there, any variety of senses of decolonisation can in precept be proffered that heart across the eradication or abolition of coloniality, versus colonialism correct (as in decolonisation1) or any tinge of inheritance from the colonial interval (as in decolonisation2). If coloniality is outlined such that the usage of creolized languages, liberal democratic establishments, “Western” philosophical ideas, and the like are understood to not essentially be tokens of coloniality, or extra broadly proof that coloniality has not been eradicated, then a significant sense of decolonisation could possibly be developed that places forth emphasis on eradicating what has a permanent colonial perform however not merely a colonial “tinge.”
There’s a lot additional to unpack right here that constraints of house prohibit, so let me reduce to the chase. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that we articulate coloniality2 as “these inheritances from colonial histories that inhibit the flourishing of modernity.” Allow us to outline decolonisationn as “efforts to facilitate the eradication of coloniality2.” From this, it appears to comply with that Táíwò’s contentions don’t entail that the decolonisation trope should be deserted, since in precept this trope may take the type of decolonisationn, and by the letter of those definitions, it will appear that Táíwò is a proponent of decolonisationn.
Does this resolve the matter of whether or not the decolonisation trope must be deserted? Actually not. For one, it’s one factor to counsel a brand new sense of a time period and fairly one other to implement and popularize it. Maybe, additional, Táíwò is right that the luggage of the decolonisation2 idea has muddied the waters to the purpose the place it will be simpler to check conceptual options that undertake different tropes or develop new ones. But it should even be acknowledged that the broader issues with the decolonisation trope are widespread to many tropes. Suppose, for example, that one was to counsel “abolition” in its place formulation to decolonisation, as many students have achieved (although not essentially viewing these phrases as mutually unique). Already, the literature on “abolition” is rife with vagueness and equivocation, simply as is the literature on decolonisation.
By extension, in fact, we should word that Táíwò’s argumentative technique rests on a dedication to the trope of modernity. On this regard, his dedication shouldn’t be distinctive, since proponents of decolonisation2 and decoloniality are simply as steadfast in using this trope as is Táíwò. Táíwò, certainly, has the advantage of getting elaborated a very clear and developed philosophical account of modernity as a philosophical idea in addition to the historical past of that idea’s relation each to Africa and to colonialism. However it’s honest to lift the difficulty that Táíwò’s account of modernity diverges in that means significantly from the sense of that time period employed by many proponents of decolonisation2 and decoloniality. The latter have a tendency to attract closely on 20th-century European notions of modernity which incorporate fairly a bit greater than the three primary tenets of modernity as Táíwò conceives it. It’s honest to lift the difficulty that Táíwò might have modernity1 in thoughts whereas in dialogue with those that have modernity2 in thoughts. I’m typically sympathetic, although with reservations that don’t bear elaboration right here, to Táíwò’s case for why we ought to perceive “modernity” to indicate what Táíwò understands it to imply. But when the advantages of the modernity trope relaxation no less than partly on wresting its that means away from those that have overstretched or abused the idea, that implies no less than in precept that defending modernity will be appropriate with defending some idea of decolonisation that Táíwò’s wonderful polemic has not but refuted.
My criticism, then, doesn’t resolve the matter of whether or not the decolonisation trope must be deserted; to point out {that a} extra priceless conception of an idea could possibly be meaningfully employed does nothing to point out whether or not efforts to instantiate such an idea would engender extra profit than hurt. Táíwò has introduced a transparent case for why we would contemplate the decolonisation trope, no less than within the African context, to trigger extra hurt than profit.
The upshot, then, is that taking this critique of the textual content significantly doesn’t shift the onus again to Táíwò. As I see it, it merely repeats Táíwò’s requires “the decolonisers” to supply a clearer account of their view and its relation to modernity, participating Táíwò’s broader corpus. I’ve endeavored to the touch on these points right here, although there may be far more to be mentioned. Táíwò’s textual content speaks to considerations I’ve raised elsewhere about the notion of the decolonial attitude superseding the theoretical attitude and the problem of decolonisation in the spirit of seriousness. A easy articulation of the matter, to borrow the concept offered by Lewis Gordon, is that decolonial principle will be conceived of as a self-discipline that, like every other, is liable to tendencies towards disciplinary decadence. Individually, I don’t discover Táíwò’s case compelling sufficient to surrender on the mission about occupied with the that means of decolonisation post-independence. However for these engaged in that mission, reckoning significantly with Táíwò’s textual content could also be essential to keep away from a destiny whereby the tropes of decolonisation and decoloniality perform, finally, to strengthen situations of coloniality.
Thomas Meagher
Thomas Meagher is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Sam Houston State University. He makes a speciality of Africana philosophy, philosophy of race, phenomenology, political principle, existentialism, and philosophy of science. Meagher earned his PhD on the College of Connecticut in 2018 and has beforehand been a Visiting Assistant Professor at Quinnipiac College, Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy on the College of Memphis, and a W. E. B. Du Bois Visiting Scholar Fellow at College of Massachusetts, Amherst.
