This text obtained an honourable point out within the undergraduate class of the 2024 Nationwide Oxford Uehiro Prize in Sensible Ethics. Written by Gabriel McWilliams.
The idea of a virtuous character is a foundational tenet of the broader advantage ethics doctrine. It has, although, been topic to noteworthy objection. One such objection arises from the idea of situationism, which – broadly talking – repudiates the notion of constant ethical characters and frameworks in favour of a view that emphasises the contextual specifics of ethical conditions because the figuring out issue(s) in each ethical motion and final result. This essay will discover Aristotle’s conception of a virtuous character adopted by situationist criticisms of this idea, important counter-criticism supplied by trendy advantage ethicists and, lastly, the restrictions this counter-criticism locations on the idea of a virtuous character. This essay expects to conclude that, sure, the Aristotelian idea is weakened, however, in precise truth, not as a direct results of the objections supplied by situationism.
Initially, one should re-familiarise oneself with how Aristotle defines a ‘virtuous character’ Firstly, Aristotle presents the idea of advantage as a trait possessed by objects and characters alike. Second: telos – a given object or character’s final finish. Subsequent, Aristotle defines character as a group of inclinations and habits; the sum of 1’s virtues and vices; a developed, developable cluster of inclinations to behave in distinct methods in sure circumstances. Fourthly, increasing the notion of telos, Aristotle remarks on his telos which he suggests is eudaimonia and is summarised within the Nichomachean Ethics as “residing and doing nicely”; essentially the most wonderful type of the human telos: rising and growing one’s capacities, residing healthily and flourishing (Aristotle, 1095a 15–22). This, Aristotle makes use of as a reference level. A method of measuring how virtuous a personality is by evaluating the ethical choices one makes in opposition to the final word finish of advantage – eudaimonia – and a approach of measuring ethical development ranging from easy inclinations to behave; ending with routine, virtuous ethical actions. Subsequently, for Aristotle, a virtuous character essentially workouts virtues in performing in the direction of a flourishing state of eudaimonia (it’s (one’s) telos ) and does so because of a development from instinctual motion in the direction of well-cultivated, virtuous, ethical habits and traits.
These views have, nevertheless, confronted criticism. One of the vital urgent of which might be attributed to the college of thought generally known as situationism. The actual critique this essay will give attention to is Harman’s. Which, as Miller remarks in his personal 2017 evaluation of character and situationism, clearly establishes the view that the ‘central dedication’ of Aristotelian advantage ethics to some type of constant, secure, world and developable ‘virtuous character’ permits for advantage ethics to be controverted by the empirical findings of psychological experiments, and subsequent essential evaluation, which present that the notion of such a personality is misguided (Harman, 1999) (Miller, C. B., 2017, Part 1.1).
One such experiment is Milgram’s research Obedience to Authority by which individuals had been instructed to manage more and more painful electrical shocks as punishment for ineptitude displayed by, whom the themes believed to be, a co-participant. The co-participant (in actuality, a collaborator of the experimenter) was clearly in agony, but a majority of the individuals continued to inflict higher ache till the utmost diploma (Milgram. 1963, p371-78).
For Harman, the outright quantity of individuals prepared to topic one other to – what seemed to be, to the individuals a minimum of – excruciating ache is outstanding. First, he expresses the view that one intuitive and “extraordinarily tempting” response to the research is likely to be “to attribute the topic’s efficiency to a personality defect within the topic fairly than to particulars of the state of affairs” (Harman, 1999, p322). Nevertheless, as Harman himself goes on to conclude, this can be a problematic assumption. One which appears to contradict the truth that greater than two-thirds of the individuals acted on this, supposedly faulty, method and, furthermore, the account of character or trait-based actions supplied by advantage ethics and – from a less complicated, extra intuitive, perspective: anticipated, typical, ethical behaviours. Harman asks rhetorically: “can we actually attribute a 2 to 1 majority response to a personality defect?” (Harman, 1999, p322). Patently he thinks not. Thus, in flip, the query is requested: if not character (defects), then what is the reason for such alarming behaviours? For Harman, the reply begins within the lack of ability of individuals to make sense of the punishment they’re inflicting and the cruelty of their actions. Knowledgeable by Ross and Nesbitt, Harman finally agrees that there was merely no approach for individuals to have arrived at a ‘secure definition’ of the state of affairs they discovered themselves in (Ross & Nesbitt, 1991. p56-8). This rationalization overcomes the implausibility of a faulty ethical inhabitants by means of its rationalization of the behaviours noticed in Obedience to Authority with reference to not character or advantage, however state of affairs alone (Harman, 1999).
At this level, Milgram’s research and Harman’s evaluation of it have illuminated points within the Aristotelian moral account which help a robust essential place for the situationist. One which, together with comparable research and analyses, is used to help a common situationist denial of the idea of a virtuous character. They achieve this fairly just by deemphasising the explanatory function of inner inclinations in favour of situational elements. In Obedience to Authority , that is significantly evident within the method by which individuals, first, protested harming their co-participant (a declaration of ethical character maybe) and but continued to take action when influenced by the state of affairs and instructed by the authority of the experiment (the experimenter) that they have to. The crux of the situationist criticism supplied right here is that while inflicting punishment to such an extent could nicely have been an motion that contradicted the ethical character and behaviours that one would possibly consider they possess or anticipate of oneself or others; crucially, it’s not an motion that appears to contradict the bulk response of the research. In different phrases, in Milgram’s research, cruelty was constant – astonishingly so! Thereby, there should be an alternate rationalization for this consistency that should exclude character traits and in addition, because of this, the idea of a ‘virtuous character’. This rationalization, for the situationist, is, in fact, situational and contextual elements.
This entails regarding ramifications for the Aristotelian idea of a ‘virtuous character’. It needn’t but be deserted although. The doctrine of advantage ethics – within the Aristotelian mould – can and does retort. Nevertheless, these retorts should be examined so as to exactly decide the extent to which and the grounds upon the notion of ‘virtuous character’ might be disputed. The rest of this essay will endeavour to do precisely that.
To start, maybe essentially the most orthodox of those defensive retorts takes difficulty with the actual nature of character and the conception of character traits that situationism criticises. For the Aristotelian advantage ethicist, situationism misunderstands and oversimplifies what character is by defining it in isolation by finding out one given behaviour. True virtuous character, for Aristotle, quite the opposite, is inordinately complicated. It’s current in lots of behavioural actions, it seems in a different way in a wide range of conditions and contexts, it happens because of ethical contemplation and the cultivation of advantage, it guides one; it doesn’t merely dispose one to behave and, crucially, it requires sensible knowledge and ethical information (Aristotle, NE). In ignoring this, situationism topics itself to the declare {that a} virtuous character can’t be controverted if not will not be understood within the first place. Homiak emboldens this place stating that because of its false impression, situationism’s principal objection isn’t any actual objection in any respect. It should as an alternative be recognised for what it’s: a false assumption that whole ethical characters might be generalised from distinctive behaviours that stereotypically correspond with a sure sort of character (Homiak, 2003, Part 5.2). It is a compelling response and is one which downgrades the crux of situationism’s common denial of character.
The situationist, although, can provide potential counter-criticism and would possibly achieve this by, firstly, accepting how situationism’s common declare in opposition to character has been negated however then, secondly, refining specific empirical proof that highlights a criticism situationism stays able to making. Specifically, a definite lack throughout research of cross-situational consistency. This, the situationist would possibly say, nonetheless controverts the idea of a ‘virtuous’ Aristotelian character as an inconsistent and incoherent character couldn’t enable for advantage to be developed throughout circumstances and over a time period in the identical method that Aristotle prescribes. Kametekar, a contemporary advantage ethicist, nevertheless, disagrees. While, initially, Kamtekar reinforces the situationist declare that the idea of a virtuous character is supervenient on cross-situational consistency she proceeds to comment that “consistency [is] relative to the person’s personal outlook on life, as formed by her values, objectives, plans, and the like. So to exterior observers, somebody is likely to be performing very inconsistently, however from her personal perspective the sample of behaviour makes good sense” (Kamtekar, 2004, p485). This provides additional circumstances of complexity to the conception of character by highlighting the psychological states of brokers, thus affirming the notion that the situationist conception of character is just too facile to pose a real concern to an idea as completely developed and complex because the Aristotelian ‘virtuous character’.
In defending the idea of a virtuous character in such a way, although, a precarious place is assumed. Defining a virtuous character in phrases so complicated and interwoven offers rise to severe sensible and epistemic considerations over the precise plausibility of the idea. My considerations are grounded within the notion {that a} virtuous character of such sophistication and intricacy would little question be each extraordinarily uncommon to understand and supremely tough to realize. A lot so, maybe, that one may hardly be blamed for being so indifferent from the idea that they’d battle to, first, outline it – and even assemble the idea – and, subsequently, attempt in the direction of it – in a eudaimonic style. It’s all nicely and good to have fun the minutia of philosophical postulates, the coherence and competence they could reveal and the integrity they might impart; supplied that these exact same circumstances of complexity don’t consign the very idea they underpin to abstractedness and ineffability. It is a advantageous line, critics argue, Aristotelian’s have did not err on the right aspect of by establishing an idea so complicated that’s so onerous to outline, to realize, to proof that it maybe turns into futile to deal with in any significant approach.
This leaves the Aristotelian idea in between two factors of criticism. On the one hand, a virtuous character too complicated turns into epistemically and virtually doubtful. On the opposite, an idea too easy reinvites criticism that makes a declare to the insignificance of character in ethical conditions which, as already seen, is so extreme that Harman claims “it might even be the case that there isn’t a such factor as character” (Harman, 1999, p316). This forces the Aristotelian to retain its complicated edifice of character so as to keep, in some type, the idea of a virtuous character in any respect. In doing so, nevertheless, the idea of a virtuous character is weakened.
Lastly, Aristotle’s idea of a virtuous character is one that originally holds up nicely in opposition to the objections of situationism. The counter-criticisms supplied by Homiak and Kamtekar, one would possibly say, efficiently keep the declare that there’s, certainly, such a factor as a virtuous character. This defence, although, invitations additional criticism that undermines the idea to an important extent. Consigning it, I’ve argued, to an idea that’s conceptually viable however can’t be aspired in the direction of in any significant method. Curiously, although, this undermining doesn’t truly accord with wider situationist thought – a minimum of indirectly. Ergo, situationism doesn’t exhibit that there isn’t a such factor as a virtuous character. As an oblique results of its criticism, nevertheless, the idea of virtuous character is severely undermined. Finally, on steadiness, I might say, to not the extent that the notion might be controverted in its entirety, however sufficient to forged sufficient doubt over the sensible utility of Aristotle’s account of advantage and character and the epistemic validity of the idea that it ought to not be most well-liked to different ethical frameworks as a helpful means of ethical betterment or steering.
Bibliography
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Harman, G. (1999). “Ethical Philosophy Meets Social Psychology”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Sequence, Vol. 99 (1999).
Homiak, Marcia. (2003). “Ethical Character”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer season 2019 Version), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
Kamtekar, R. (2004). “Situationism and Advantage Ethics on the Content material of Our Character”. Ethics.
Milgram, S. (1963). “Behavioural Research of Obedience”. Journal of Irregular and Social Psychology. Miller, C. B. (2017). “Character and Situationism: New Instructions”. Moral Principle and Ethical Observe, Vol. 20, no. 3, 2017, pp. 459–71.
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