| Umut Baysan |
I’m grateful to the Imperfect Cognitions weblog for inviting me to jot down a submit on my current publication “Are propositional attitudes mental states?”, forthcoming in Minds and Machines.
Within the paper, I discover some implications of the view that some group entities (e.g., golf equipment, governments, corporations) can have beliefs and needs. I argue that if group entities can have beliefs and needs, this may present that beliefs and needs aren’t psychological states. I’m not fully satisfied that group entities can actually have beliefs and desires—though I feel there are some causes to take this risk severely, as I talk about within the paper. What I actually need to obtain within the paper is to point out that in case you are ready to just accept this place, you need to be ready to just accept the considerably stunning conclusion that beliefs and needs aren’t psychological states. When you discover this end result unacceptable, maybe you must also discover the view that group entities can have beliefs and needs unacceptable.
My major argument is that this: If beliefs and needs are psychological states, then solely minded beings may have them. In any case, a bodily property might be had solely by bodily beings. So, by analogy, a psychological property or state can solely be had by psychological, or minded beings. However group entities aren’t minded beings. In different phrases, there aren’t any group minds. So, if group entities can have beliefs and needs, then beliefs and needs aren’t psychological states.
Why do I feel that group entities aren’t minded beings? As I clarify within the paper, I work with a conception of thoughts based on which a being is minded solely whether it is of such a sort that there’s something it’s wish to be it. We’re minded beings, and there’s something it’s wish to be us. In distinction, there’s nothing it’s wish to be a rock or an electron—sorry panpsychists!—and rocks and electrons aren’t minded beings. I maintain that group entities are like rocks and electrons on this respect.
One fascinating implication of this conclusion (i.e., beliefs and needs aren’t psychological states) is that it offers us a method to refute the concept there’s “cognitive phenomenology”, i.e., there’s something it’s wish to imagine that p. My proposal is that beliefs are “multiply realizable” states: they’re realized by non-mental states in non-minded beings resembling teams, and they’re usually realized by psychological states in minded beings like us, particularly when we’ve occurrent beliefs. When the state that realizes a perception is a phenomenally aware psychological state, there’s something it’s wish to be in that related psychological state. However that related psychological state will not be the idea in query; relatively, it’s a realizer of the idea. I feel it is a great way of rejecting cognitive phenomenology as a result of it acknowledges the intuitive concept that there’s usually one thing it’s wish to be us when we’ve beliefs, nevertheless it doesn’t entail that there’s something it’s wish to imagine that p.
One other fascinating implication of the arguments of the paper is that they make sure claims about group beliefs and needs simpler to digest. If I’m proper, saying that teams have beliefs or needs mustn’t quantity to saying that there are group minds. If one has qualms in regards to the concept of a bunch thoughts, that shouldn’t thereby be a purpose to reject group beliefs or group needs.
