There are the “View X-ers” and “the Curious-ers”.
These are names Joshua Knobe (Yale) provides to 2 broad approaches to philosophy.
In a current interview, he says:
Quite a lot of a long time in the past, there was a transparent sense that your aim as a thinker needs to be to articulate an enormous new philosophical view after which argue that everybody else is mistaken and your new view is true. So there was a widespread understanding that you simply have been purported to have some paper the place you say: “On this paper, I boldly introduce View X.” Then, over the course of the following few a long time, you have been supposed to maintain saying that View X was proper and defending it in opposition to all objections. Let’s discuss with philosophers who do that as “View X-ers.”
The View X-ers all the time get loads of consideration, they usually can typically handle to upstage the philosophers engaged in one other, very completely different type of inquiry. Essentially the most noticeable truth about these different philosophers is that they’re curious about philosophical questions. They’re fascinated about the massive points, however they aren’t wedded to any particular view about these points. As an alternative, they’re centered totally on attempting to think twice concerning the proof and what it suggests concerning the numerous completely different views. We are able to refer to those philosophers because the “Curious-ers.”
In keeping with Knobe, we want extra of the curious-ers:
Historically, I feel the Curious-ers have been utterly underrated. They did a number of incredible work, however all the eye acquired sucked up by the View X-ers. Issues are clearly starting to alter on that dimension—however we nonetheless haven’t gone far sufficient. We want much more love for the Curious-ers!
I don’t fairly know what I take into consideration this distinction. It appears to me that there are many philosophers who introduce a view, argue for its correctness, and defend it in opposition to objections, and so will look like “View X-ers” from the surface, or on reflection. However this method needn’t be owed to dogmatism, or behavior, or arational influences, or lack of curiosity. On the contrary, one is likely to be fairly open-minded however not discover alternate options to their very own View X compelling. Or it is likely to be curiosity that spurs a thinker to give attention to their View X—curiosity about whether or not it may possibly stand up to sure sorts of objections, or be prolonged, or be utilized to new issues. Perhaps Knobe solely had in thoughts thoroughgoing View X-ers, not the merely obvious ones. However how good is our proof that any obvious View X-er is a thoroughgoing one?
Take Rawls. On the floor, he might come to thoughts for example of a “View X-er.” In any case, he did have a view and he defended it for many years. But he acted like a “Curious-er”, too. Take into account: the multidisciplinary breadth in proof in A Idea of Justice and within the content material of his view, that main fundamental points of his principle modified over time in response to critics, that objections to his view led to his explorations of and basic contributions to a brand new department of political philosophy. No matter you might consider his view or his work, he doesn’t come off as missing in curiosity. Maybe Knobe has higher examples in thoughts.
Even when we’d query the excellence, it does seem to be some philosophers might higher exemplify invaluable “curiosity about philosophical questions” of their work than others, or an consideration to “massive points” with a mode of inquiry characterised extra by open-minded agnosticism reasonably than defensiveness. I’d go together with Knobe’s name for for giving some love to those philosophers. Let’s hear who they’re.
