Douglas L. Berger. Indian and Intercultural Philosophy: Personhood, Consciousness, and Causality. viii + 231 pp., London, New York, and Dublin: Bloomsbury Tutorial. 2021. $115 (hardback).
Within the introduction of Indian and Intercultural Philosophy Berger notes: “In sure respects, a lot of the chapters on this quantity will . . . strike some readers as controversial and provocative” (p. 11). This declare is demonstratively true in Berger’s studying of Śaṅkara as a dualist (Chapter 1) and Berger’s rejection of Candrakīrti’s exegesis of Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 24:18 (Chapter 4). Whereas such claims oppose conventional readings and scholarship, Berger gives convincing arguments that decision for vital responses (or continuation of response as within the case of his studying of MMK 24:18).
The ebook is split into three sections: (i) Brahmanical philosophy, (ii) Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy, and (iii) intercultural philosophy. Because the ebook is a group of impartial papers, I’ll present a cursory synopsis of every chapter.
The First Part
Chapter One focuses on an evaluation of Śaṅkara via Daya Krishna’s Indian Philosophy: A Counter-Perspective. Berger argues that Śaṅkara propounds solely a non-dualism of the self: there aren’t any a number of selves; there is just one self, Brahman. He argues that Śaṅkara accepts Sāṃkhya’s tattva and Sāṃkhyin dualism, however disagrees over the variety of puruṣa-s.
Chapter Two is a reprint of Berger’s chapter in Kuznetsova, Ganeri, Ram-Prasad’s (eds.) Hindu and Buddhist Ideas in Dialogue. On this chapter, he gives a protection of the Naiyāyika argument that self-consciousness continues via time. He does so via a phenomenological argument grounded on the subjectivity and company required for reminiscence, however he notes that the argument is restricted by the unchanging nature of ātman.
Chapter Three focuses on the Buddhist/Naiyāyika debate over vikalpa. He argues that the Buddhist accounts of vikalpa create a division between creativeness and notion, whereas Vācaspati Miśra’s account reveals that the interconnection of creativeness and reminiscence assist guides us to understand exterior objects accurately.
The Second Part
Chapter 4 is a transforming of Berger’s “Acquiring Emptiness: Interpreting Nāgārjuna’s MMK 24:18”. On this chapter, Berger builds off Joseph Walser’s Nāgārjuna in Context and argues in opposition to Candrakīrti’s declare that neither ‘vacancy’ nor ‘causally conditioned co-arising’ ought to be understood as referential. Berger argues that Candrakīrti has taken a number of missteps in his exegesis of MMK 24:18. This leads Berger to say (i) that ‘vacancy’ and ‘casually conditioned co-arising’ are synonymous, (ii) that following the center manner is knowing that every one issues are causally conditioned co-arisings, and (iii) ‘vacancy’ and ’causally situation co-arising’ are referential and never mere conceptual constructions.
Chapter 5 expands B. S. Yadav’s account of Nāgārjuna’s and Candrakīrti’s deconstruction of svabhāva as inherently focusing on the essentialism of Nyāya and Advaita. This assault on essentialism expands to an additional assault on the elitism (e.g. the caste system) imbedded in Brahmanical soteriology.
Chapter Six is a reprint of Berger’s chapter in Wang’s (ed.) Deconstruction and the Ethical in Asian Thought. On this chapter, he argues that Nāgārjuna’s “deconstruction” just isn’t similar to Derridean deconstruction, however, as a substitute, Nāgārjuna gives a possible critique of Derrida by dissolving the stress between regulation and justice or giver and recipient via prioritizing and equalizing nirvāṇa with saṃsāra.
The Third Part
Chapter Seven is an enlargement and rewriting of Berger’s “Relational and Intrinsic Moral Roots”. This chapter compares Mencius’ account of 孝 xiao (trans. filial piety) and Geoffrey Ashton’s evaluation of the Bhagavad Gītā’s “name to social obligation”. Berger argues that Mencius gives a greater decision for ethical dilemmas, by which one’s household obligation and social obligation battle, via a relational mannequin of the self.
Chapter Eight builds off Berger’s Encounters of the Mind and gives his personal account of luminous consciousness between the sensible fashions (prabhāsvaram cittaṃ or 明心 ming xin) and the metaphysical fashions (prakāśatva or 清浄心 qing jing xin).
Chapter 9 is a reprint of Berger’s “The Unlikely Commentator”. This chapter focuses on Dārā Shukōh’s makes an attempt at synchronizing Islamic philosophy and Upaniṣadic philosophy. Dārā bases this transfer on Śaṅkara’s commentary on the Upaniṣads.
Chapter Ten is a reprint of Berger’s chapter in Conard’s (ed.) Nietzsche and the Philosophers. This chapter explains Nietzsche’s understanding of Buddhism and develops right into a critique of Nietzsche’s understanding of the Buddha as a nihilist, by which Berger in the end claims that Nietzsche’s philosophy would belong to what the early Buddhist referred to as ‘nihilism’.
In brief, the chapters of Indian and Intercultural Philosophy spotlight Berger’s profession and reveals the influence he has had on the modern examine of Indian philosophy. Every chapter is well-argued and compelling–his continuation of the controversy over Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 24:8 (Chapter 4) and his continued evaluation of luminous consciousness (Chapter 5) are of particular curiosity.
My foremost criticism is that the “intercultural” ingredient of the ebook is restricted to the final 4 chapters, which leaves a lot of the ebook partaking with solely Indian philosophy. With Berger’s experience in intercultural philosophy, an additional engagement of Indian philosophy with Islamic philosophy or Chinese language philosophy would have been of welcome addition to much-needed scholarship.
One factor that could be disappointing for some readers, who’re acquainted with Berger’s work, is the variety of reprints within the ebook (Chapters Two, Six, 9, and Ten), however such readers will possible discover the opposite six chapters as a worthwhile learn (particularly the reworked Chapters 4 and Seven).
Reviewed by Chris Rahlwes, College of Connecticut (website here)
